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ABSTRACT 
While external attacks on the corporate LAN still pose a major obstacle to network 
administrators, internal attacks cause as much or more chaos. In fact, internal attacks can be 
potentially much more threatening as compared to external attacks since those performing the 
attacks are usually authenticated users who know more about the network they are attacking. 
Also, internal attacks can be carried out with much more ease as most organizations adopt the 
policy of rigorously protecting the network from the outside, but leaving the inside almost 
entirely unattended. 
Recently many different technologies have been both proposed and implemented 
which are designed to provide better security for the internal corporate network. Most of 
these implementations, though, are designed to provide security for mission critical machines 
such as servers which hold important company files, records, etc. Some more recent 
technologies have started to view security for the entire corporate network including client 
machines. Distributed Firewall technologies have been proposed for providing a corporate-
wide client machine firewall implementation which is centrally managed. The problem here 
lies in the fact that many corporate users today are no longer stationary in their job function. 
Their job requires them to use various client machines which may be located within varying 
areas of the corporate network. 
The following paper describes a theoretical framework for implementing a distributed 
firewall system which is capable of "following" users wherever they may go within the 
corporate network dubbed the Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewall. A description is 
given as to how this firewall technology can be implemented as well as the inherent 
Vlll 
advantages it gives. A proof-of-concept implementation of this technology is also presented 
to help convey the implementation of this technology. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
A growing concern for insider abuse on company LAN s over recent years has thrust 
the area of security on the internal LAN to the forefront of computer security issues. With 
companies reporting that insider abuse accounts for eighty percent of network attacks, this 
growing concern is certainly not unfounded (CSI/FBI, 2003). The classical configuration of 
the corporate network is also becoming redefined as remote users and business partners are 
allowed access to its resources. Also, the growing number of wireless implementations 
within corporate LAN s has caused the boundaries of the internal LAN to swell to include 
anyone who has access to the signal. Companies are rushing to obtain technologies which 
will help to secure this weakness within their systems but are finding that the few products 
that do exist far exceed the monetary value they have placed on the data they intend to 
protect. This paper will propose a new security measure for locking down hosts on a 
corporate network dubbed the Roaming User-Based Distributable Firewall implementation. 
1.1 FIREWALLS 
A firewall is simply a protective network device. Firewalls are designed to allow 
certain information into and out of a group of computers or possibly a standalone computer 
by way of a controlled point of entry (Zalenski, 2002). Different types of firewalls exist 
based on various types of identifying criteria. One method for taxonimizing firewalls 
describes the device by the manner in which it filters data, while a second method is based on 
the firewall's position in the network topology. This network-type of categorization will be 
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explored here to provide a historical context which will aid understanding of concepts 
presented later in the paper. 
1.1.1 NETWORK-BASED (GATEWAY) FIREWALLS 
Gateway firewalls were the first generation of firewall technology and were designed 
to protect the corporate network from the outside world, while implicitly trusting users on the 
internal network. Gateway firewalls are still extremely vital to the security of an internal 
corporate network, providing the initial line of defense against an outside threat to the 
network. Gateway firewalls also allow for selectively granting access to certain resources 
outside the corporate network for users. 
With a corporation typically only having one connection to the Internet, the perimeter 
gateway firewall provides for a single point of management. Many companies employ few, 
if any personnel who are solely in charge of network security; therefore, the gateway firewall 
provides for simple management due to it typically being installed on one device. While 
gateway firewalls offer perimeter defense, they will fall short when internal security is 
required. As noted earlier, the increasing prevalence of inside attacks as well as the growing 
deployment of wireless corporate networks requires protection from units within the 
network; a network-based firewall cannot view traffic among internal users due to its 
position in the network topology and thus cannot defend against within-network attacks. 
1.1.2 HOST -BASED FIREWALLS 
Host-based firewalls provide another layer of protection for critical internal machines 
from the outside world as well as a minimal layer of protection from internal threats. Host-
3 
based firewalls are deployed exclusively on certain host machines to filter traffic which the 
gateway firewall missed. Host-based firewalls can also offer protection for a single machine 
from internal threats. 
With certain individual machines possessing firewalls, host-based firewalls cause a 
nightmare for IT management. Each machine running a host-based firewall has to be 
managed individually, meaning that the administrator either has to physically go to each 
machine to maintain it, or set up a secure connection to the machine for remote individual 
management. 
Host-based firewalls provide security for individual hosts from internal threats, but 
require large amounts of time for system maintenance. The host-based firewall brings the 
same security advantages provided by the gateway firewall to the internal host at 
considerable cost, in that there is no mechanism for simplified management. While secure 
connections can allow all configurational operations to be made from a single location, each 
separate host-based firewall must still be administrated individually. 
1.1.3 DISTRIBUTED FIREWALLS 
Distributed firewalls are a revolutionary development which exploit firewall 
technology to help secure all internal hosts from other internal rogue hosts while also 
providing a simple centralized management system. Distributed firewalls deploy host-based 
firewall technology for each host on a network, which allows for complete control of traffic 
which is admitted into a host and permitted out. The advantage of a distributed firewall 
implementation is significant from a cost standpoint; unlike conventional host-based systems, 
a centralized policy server is used to manage each individual firewall from one location. 
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Hosts download the configuration for their individual firewall on startup automatically 
without any user intervention. Also, this policy server allows hosts to be grouped to allow 
one policy to be used for all the hosts in the respective group. 
A distributed firewall implementation, however, does not allow for separate users to 
use a single host computer and yet obtain individualized firewall configurations. Many 
companies employ technology to allow an employee to be a "roaming" user. This allows an 
employee to use different machines and yet still retain the same settings no matter which 
workstation is used. Distributed firewall implementations do not allow for such fine-grained 
control since each host is assigned a certain firewall configuration despite which user is 
logged on. 
1.2 ROAMING USER-BASED DISTRIBUTED FIREWALL (RUBDF) 
Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewalls build on the distributed firewall 
technology and also provide for more fine-grained control of the firewall for specific users' 
needs. As discussed above, the major weakness of a distributed firewall infrastructure 
resides in its lack of support for multiple-user machines and also roaming users. The 
Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewall infrastructure uses the same basic structure 
provided by a distributed firewall implementation, while adding the ability to manage 
internal network access at the true user level instead of just at the host level. This provides 
for a much more user-friendly and manageable solution to a business's internal security 
needs. 
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1.3 IMPLEMENTATION METHODS FOR ROAMING USER-BASED 
DISTRIBUTED FIREWALLS 
There exist two implementation methods for the deployment of a Roaming User-
Based Distributed Firewall infrastructure-hardware-based and software-based. 
1.3.1 HARDWARE-BASED 
Hardware-based implementations of a Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewall 
infrastructure allow for gains in security on the internal network. With hardware-based 
implementations, the firewall is located on a specialized network card which is plugged into 
the host. Distributed firewall implementations have been more likely to choose this 
implementation method (Markham, 2001) (Markham, 2003) (Meredith, 2003) (Payne, 2001). 
If the firewall technology is separate from the host's operating system, this allows for greater 
security, since even if the operating system on the host becomes compromised, the firewall 
will still be intact as a buffer between the compromised host and the rest of the internal 
network. 
Hardware-based implementations of a Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewall 
infrastructure require the use of specific hardware which is separate from the host computer. 
This added hardware costs substantially more than the normal network interface card. It is 
also much more costly than most software-based implementations of the same technology. 
1.3.2 SOFTWARE-BASED 
Software-based implementations of a Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewall 
infrastructure employ the use of software present on the host machine. Many of these 
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technologies are quite inexpensive or even included in the operating system which is present 
on the host. While a possible breach in the host's operating system may compromise the 
machine, the firewalls are still present on all other machines on the network and still provide 
protection against this rogue host. 
1.4 PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to develop a concept for a Roaming User-Based 
Distributed Firewall infrastructure. Currently, there exists no formal specification on 
Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewalls. The idea has been mentioned by Meredith in his 
paper on the Autonomic Distributed Firewall Project, but the details were not discussed 
(Meredith, 2003). Vague references are also made by certain Distributed Firewall products 
currently on the market, such as 3Com's Embedded Firewall and Sygate's Managed Personal 
Firewall, but sparse details are provided (3Com, 2005) (Sygate, 2003). Ideas from the above 
firewall topics will be integrated to develop a framework for use on production networks. 
The ideas from distributed firewalls will be the primary source of fodder to work with. 
These current technologies will be improved upon to make up for their inherent weaknesses. 
This paper will also present a sample implementation of a Roaming User-Based 
Distributed Firewall infrastructure on a small internal network. This implementation will 
take advantage of current technologies including Windows Server 2003 and Windows XP 
Professional Edition. Technologies used within these software packages will include Internet 
Connection Firewall (pre-SP2), Windows Firewall (post-SP2), and Visual Basic script. Also, 
the administration tool AutoIT will be employed. Sample code and configuration parameters 
will be available at the end of this paper. 
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1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewall implementations are being discussed here 
as a tool to help secure the internal corporate LAN. Therefore, research will be gathered in 
the area of internal LAN security threats. With the expansion of the corporate network to 
include remote users, business partners, and wireless users, security threats related to these 
technologies and circumstances will also be discussed. 
Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewall implementations are a new technology 
which will rely heavily on the features of previous firewall implementations. For this reason, 
research will be gathered pertaining to previous firewall technologies, predominantly 
distributed firewalls. This research will explore the implementation details behind the 
current technological trends in the area and help to give a benchmark for where the current 
technology resides and where it can be improved. 
Based upon the findings from the pertinent research, a blueprint will be developed to 
describe a Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewall implementation. This blueprint will 
describe the basic structure of a Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewall implementation. 
To verify the blueprint developed, a sample implementation of a Roaming User-
Based Distributed Firewall infrastructure will be developed. This will help to explore one 
method of implementation using current technologies. This will also serve as a working 
example of what corporations can implement for themselves on their respective internal 
networks. 
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1.6 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this research includes an examination of corporate network security, the 
current trends in firewall technology, and a blueprint for and implementation of a Roaming 
User-Based Distributed Firewall infrastructure. 
Limitations of the research include the use of specific software during the 
implementation. The specific implementation of a Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewall 
infrastructure relies on specific software products by certain vendors. Other implementations 
on different architectures may be more cumbersome due to separate components not being 
completely integrated into the operating system. 
1. 7 PLAN OF PRESENTATION 
The following chapters will help to describe in detail both the pertinent background 
information as well as novel information specific to the paper. Chapter 2 is a literature 
review of necessary background information needed in a discussion of a Roaming User-
Based Distributed Firewall implementation. This discussion will include security threats and 
traditional firewall techniques, as well as distributed firewall techniques and 
implementations. Chapter 3 will include an overview of the implementation of a Roaming 
User-Based Distributed Firewall infrastructure. Chapter 4 will discuss in detail Project 
Stumper which is a proof-of-concept project which will be used to demonstrate one possible 
implementation method of a Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewall infrastructure. 
Chapter 5 will offer some concluding remarks in regard to the paper and also some 
limitations with the current implementation as well as future research plans. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Three significant research areas support the ideas fundamental to Roaming User-
Based Distributed Firewalls. These areas include traditional security threats as they apply to 
the corporate LAN, firewalls, and distributed firewalls. The following literature review is 
thereby composed of relevant information pertaining to the above topics. The three principal 
themes listed above will be composed of many subtopics which will be related to the 
discussion. The following sections provide a history of the topics, a discussion of their 
relevance to the idea of Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewalls, as well as an explanation 
of the current shortcomings of the technologies which Roaming User-Based Distributed 
Firewalls will build on top of. 
2.2 SECURITY THREATS 
With the explosive expansion of the Internet in recent years, the proliferation of 
threats to the corporate LAN has also increased exponentially. While many of these threats 
come from outside the corporate network, many others come from authenticated users on the 
local LAN. The CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey again showed that while 
viral incidents remain the most cited form of computer abuse, internal abuse comes in at a 
close second(CSI/FBI, 2003). The following is a partial listing and description of some 
possible threats which may affect the internal corporate network. 
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2.2.1 MALICIOUS CODE 
As the complexity of computer programs continues to grow, so do the amount of 
software vulnerabilities which are open to malicious code. Recently, with the much 
publicized Sasser, Slammer, and Blaster worms garnering tremendous public attention, the 
problem with software "bugs" is at the top of the list for most network administrators (PSS, 
2004) (PSS, 2003) (PSS, 2003). The problem remains that the time involved with keeping all 
the company's computing resources patched is a monstrous problem for most network 
administrators. One of the largest problems is preventing the infection from spreading. If 
just one of the internal hosts is infected then the probability of the other hosts on the internal 
LAN also being infected is substantially higher. This unwitting, rogue user is allowed to run 
with internal authorizations and therefore transfer the malicious code easily to other users 
(Markham, 2001). 
2.2.2 INSIDER THREATS 
As Internal LANs continue to grow and evolve, the probability of a rogue user greatly 
increases. Security professionals realize that the greatest threat to the internal LAN comes 
from within its own boundaries (Markham, 2001 ). While external attacks may be more 
frequent, insider attacks usually account for a much higher monetary value (CSI/FBI, 2003). 
Insiders have access to significantly higher amounts of resources as compared to external 
attackers without even traversing a firewall (Meredith, 2003). Also, insiders are more likely 
to change the existing settings on their own host machine which in tum violates the 
company's security policy and allows for greater truancy by the user (Payne, 2001). The 
problem remains that most companies do not focus on insider sabotage (Quigley, 2002). 
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Internal hosts trust one another completely which allows for a rogue user to send whatever 
traffic he or she sees fit to other users (Gahan, 1992). Companies need to be educated 
concerning internal attacks including ways in which to make the internal network more 
secure from rogue internal users. 
2.2.3 MOBILE COMPUTING (VPN} 
Mobile Computing allows any user with the proper credentials to connect to and 
utilize the internal corporate LAN from outside its boundaries. While VPNs are an important 
technology which helps to utilize employees' time more effectively and still protect the 
internal network, they also present valid security concerns. While the use of encryption by 
VPN s helps to protect the corporate network, it also blinds gateway firewalls to potentially 
malicious traffic which it would normally be capable of blocking (Markham, 2001). This 
malicious traffic could come from an unsuspecting user who has garnered a virus, or from a 
malicious user who has gained control of a mobile computing device while it is unprotected 
from the gateway corporate firewall. If the gateway firewall is capable of decrypting and 
analyzing this traffic, otherwise known as stateful packet inspection (SPI), a bottleneck forms 
which severely downgrades network speed (Markham, 2003). 
The time and money overhead involved in setting up and maintaining a VPN 
infrastructure is very substantial. Though IPSec (Internet Protocol Security) is the prominent 
protocol used for VPNs, setting up an IPSec VPN for company employees is extremely 
difficult (Meredith, 2003). The implementer must also be sure to adhere to employees' needs 
as well as organizational security policy (Meredith, 2003). The utility typically received 
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from VPN installations by a company is often matched by the time and money involved in 
constructing and sustaining them. 
2.2.4 BUSINESS PARTNERS 
Allowing business partners access to your corporate network allows for uncontested 
security breaches from outside the local LAN. Network administrators must allow partners 
inside the internal corporate network which clouds the division between insider and outsider 
(Markham, 2001). These partners must be given many of the same access rights as an 
employee within the company would possess (Quigley, 2002). The chances of a malicious 
attack from outside the traditional network greatly increase. Employees for business partners 
could use their access rights on one machine within the internal network to further 
compromise other machines on the network (Markham, 2001). The gateway firewall has no 
method of prevention as these malicious users have access to the internal corporate LAN. 
For this reason, the old adage of the good insider versus the bad outsider must be discarded 
(Markham, 2001). 
2.2.5 WIRELESS VULNERABILITIES 
Wireless access to the corporate LAN allows for various potential backdoors onto 
your internal network from any wireless installation. Many wireless access points are 
positioned within the corporate network which renders the gateway firewall useless. Once 
the gateway firewall is bypassed, the entire corporate LAN is at the mercy of an attacker 
(Keromytis, 2003). While wireless technologies free users from their physical office 
boundaries, they also allow for much greater vulnerability to transmission interception by 
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malicious users (Murthy, 1998). These transmissions include data that the company wishes 
to keep private, such as corporate data transmissions (Miller, 2001). This problem of 
eavesdropping has always been present in wired networks, but the problem is greatly 
compounded in wireless networks due to the ease with which a signal can be intercepted 
(Murthy, 1998). 
2.3 TRADITIONAL FIREWALLS 
Firewalls, in their simplest construct, can be defined as a collection of components 
placed between two networks of differing security levels (Cheswick, 1994). The firewall is 
designed in such a way that the host(s) behind the firewall is/are protected from potential 
malicious hosts on the opposite side of the firewall. Firewalls can be categorized by various 
identifying characteristics, but in the following section the distinction between firewall types 
will be categorized by the position in the network topology. 
2.3.1 NETWORK-BASED (GATEWAY) 
Gateway firewalls are commonly situated between the internal corporate network of a 
business and the connection from that network to the external world. This position is 
perpetuated by the idea that the "good guys" are inside the organization and the "bad guys" 
are outside (Meredith, 2003). As with most technologies, there exist both advantages and 
disadvantages to positioning a firewall in this way. The following sections describe the pros 
and cons associated with this firewall technology. 
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2.3.1.1 ADVANTAGES 
Network-Based firewalls offer a protective barrier between the internal network and 
external world which provides a first line of defense against potential malicious agents. 
Since most security problems are due to buggy code, firewalls offer a barrier to guard these 
vulnerable programs (Bellovin, 1999). This initial fortification for the corporate network can 
also be used to thwart many of the amateur attackers found on the Internet. Rules can also be 
setup to block traffic from known problem areas (Murthy, 1998). For many applications, 
predominantly those including legacy protocols, the gateway firewall is the only defense 
against external attacks (Bellovin, 1999). Also its position allows for quick responses to 
newly-discovered attacks (Ioannidis, 2000). 
The amount of network-based firewalls used by a corporation is usually quite small 
and therefore allows for easier maintainability. These gateway firewalls offer a single point 
for network administrators to enforce a single security policy at the network boundaries for 
all hosts on the other side (Keromytis, 2003). This single point of both entrance and exit 
offer a good mechanism for policy control as mandated by the corporation. Gateway 
firewalls allow the network administrator to set a policy on external access which determines 
what internal users are able to access on the external Internet (Bellovin, 1999). 
Gateway firewalls offer a superior approach to battling external Denial of Service 
Attacks. Denial of Service attacks are some of the most difficult to battle for a network 
administrator. Furthermore, the CSI/FBI Security Survey for 2003 showed that Denial of 
Service attacks had jumped to second on the list of attacks which are most costly (CS I/FBI, 
2003). Yet while gateway firewalls battle Denial of Service attacks more efficiently, a well 
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organized Denial of Service, or worse Distributed Denial of Service, attack can bring the 
inbound and outbound traffic of most any corporate network to a standstill. 
2.3.1.2 DISADVANTAGES 
Increasing line speeds between the internal and external networks are causing 
network-based firewalls to become overloaded with traffic. This increase in line speeds 
along with more computationally-intensive protocols which must be supported by the 
firewalls, has caused gateway firewalls to become congestion points for network traffic 
(Ioannidis, 2000). Any attempt to improve this performance typically comes at a cost to 
security policy enforcement implemented by the gateway (Keromytis, 2003). The 
disconcerting truth remains that the gap between network line speeds and processing power 
will only increase as data passing through the gateway will continue to exceed Moore's Law 
(Ioannidis, 2000). 
Certain protocols and traffic are becoming increasingly troublesome for network-
based firewalls to analyze and filter. Many existing protocols are difficult to process at the 
gateway firewall due to knowledge pertaining to the protocol which only the endpoints 
possess. Some of these protocols can be processed by application-level proxies, but this is 
usually viewed as architecturally "unclean" and sometimes too invasive (Ioannidis, 2000). 
Traffic from remote VPN users as well as other encrypted protocols is typically 
encrypted and extremely difficult to analyze at the gateway firewall, if at all. The only 
method by which the gateway firewall would be able to analyze encrypted traffic is if it were 
provided with the necessary keys to break the encryption (Bellovin, 1999). Most gateway 
firewalls do not have access to these keys for security reasons, or they are unable to 
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efficiently decrypt and inspect this traffic. For this reason, most encryption techniques blind 
the gateway firewall to the underlying content of the data (Markham, 2001 ). 
Internal users are able to construct unauthorized external connections which are not 
protected by the gateway firewall. These forms of unauthorized connections can come in the 
form of tunnels, wireless connections, and dial-up access methods (Ioannidis, 2000). 
Whether intended to be malicious or not, these backdoors add yet another entry point to the 
network to which the gateway firewall cannot control access. 
Large networks with several external connections present the arduous task of 
administering many different gateway firewalls separately. Administration becomes 
particularly difficult in both practicality and with regard to policy since no unified 
management mechanism exists (Ioannidis, 2000). Each firewall is vendor-specific and thus 
knowledge concerning the setup of one firewall does not assist in the setup of another 
(Bartal, 1999). A new set of rules and commands must be learned for each individual 
firewall which costs the organization both time and money. 
The Network-Based firewall implementation offers no form of protection for users on 
the internal network from other users on the same internal network. The assumption that all 
internal users are to be trusted has not been applicable for some time (Ioannidis, 2000). 
Internal users are capable of configuring their computers in violation of the company's 
security policy which allows the user to perform unauthorized transactions with other 
computers on the network (Payne, 2001 ). Gateway firewalls were never designed to solve 
these insider threats (Markham, 2001). In addition to this, the gateway firewall does not 
protect critical information sources which are located on the internal network leaving these 
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information sources such as databases and file servers exposed to the deviant insider 
(Meredith, 2003). 
2.3.2 HOST-BASED 
Host-Based firewalls are designed to offer added protection for certain individual host 
machines by placing a separate firewall between that machine and its external connection(s). 
This concept was engineered as a means to protect machines on the corporate network vital 
to the overall success of the business. As with gateway firewalls, host-based firewalls have 
both their respective advantages and disadvantages which are briefly outlined in the 
following sections. 
2.3.2.1 ADVANTAGES 
Host-based firewalls add an extra layer of protection for mission-critical machines 
which are located on the corporate LAN. These machines usually include such vital systems 
as databases and file servers. By incorporating a firewall at the host level, the network 
administrator is capable of much finer-grained security (Hwang, 2001). The idea is to add an 
extra buffer for this machine from the outside attacker if he or she were able to penetrate the 
outside gateway. These firewalls also add protection from the actions of a miscreant insider 
who wishes to access privileged data. 
2.3.2.2 DISADVANTAGES 
Each host-based firewall must be separately configured for the security policy which 
it is expected to adhere to. While host-based firewalls may add a much needed layer of 
protection for crucial business resources, they are also very cumbersome to maintain and 
18 
update. Each separate host-based firewall must be updated independently of all other host-
based firewalls located on the corporate network. These host-based firewalls lack a 
centralized security policy management mechanism (Pan, 2004). 
2.4 CURRENT DISTRIBUTED FIREWALL RESEARCH 
One of the objectives modeled by the International Organization for Standardization's 
(ISO's) Open Standards Interconnect (OSI) model of networking demonstrates that 
complexity in networking should be assigned to end hosts and not expected of intermediary 
systems (ISO, 2005). As outlined above, the practice of implementing a single gateway 
firewall to protect the entire corporation is becoming obsolete. This gateway firewall is 
becoming a chokepoint for the entire corporate LAN and also violates the ISO's above model 
by having too much complexity away from the edges of the network. To help alleviate the 
problems with traditional firewalls while still retaining their advantages, Steven M. Bellovin 
proposed a distributed firewall infrastructure for the corporate network (Bellovin, 1999). 
2.4.1 FOUNDATIONS 
Protecting valuable hosts within the organization with individual firewalls has been 
practiced for some time, but protecting every host on the network has not been considered 
necessary or cost-effective until recently. The fundamental idea behind distributed firewalls 
involves enforcing a single centralized security policy at every endpoint of the network 
which specifies what traffic is allowed into and out of the host. The policy is distributed to, 
and authenticated by, all endpoints on the corporate network (Keromytis, 2003). Bellovin 
outlined distributed firewalls as resting on three notions: a policy language to state what 
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connections are permitted or prohibited, a system management tool for centralizing 
management, and a network-level encryption mechanism for TCP\IP (Bellovin, 1999). In the 
following sections each of these pieces will be outlined and briefly described as they pertain 
to a distributed firewall implementation. 
2.4.1.1 POLICY LANGUAGE 
The first step to developing a network-wide policy language is to agree on a 
mechanism of identification for each end host. Bellovin discusses many delineators 
including network interface identifiers (MAC addresses) and IP addresses but ultimately 
chooses to employ cryptographic certificates to identify hosts (Bellovin, 1999). These 
certificates will ensure that valid hosts are the receivers of policy as opposed to the inside-
outside model of IP distinction currently performed by most gateway firewalls (Ioannidis, 
2000). 
To program the numerous distributed firewalls within an organization, a common 
policy language must be employed. Bellovin incorporates the use of the Key Note policy 
language to accomplish firewall updating (Bellovin, 1999). The main point is that the policy 
should be able to specify application-specific rules for each and every host in the corporation 
(Keromytis, 2003). The language should also be powerful enough to express any and all 
security requirements as put forth by company security policies (Bellovin, 1999). 
2.4.1.2 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
Ease of management for a distributed firewall infrastructure within the corporate 
network must include a centralized management system. Just as most corporate networks 
employ some system-wide management package to control access to resources on the 
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network, so too should distributed firewall policy specifications be maintained and updated 
in a central repository for all hosts on the network (Bellovin, 1999). To accommodate the 
possibly large number of hosts within the corporate network, the management system should 
allow for a hierarchical management schema which supports privilege delegation 
(Keromytis, 2003). This would allow for multiple administrators for various sections of the 
network to setup the firewall policies for the hosts present in their division of the network as 
well as protect the network from single points of failure (Xian, 2002). 
2.4.1.3 NETWORK-LEVEL ENCRYPTION 
Masking of policy rules as they are passed over the wire is an essential security factor 
in a distributed firewall infrastructure. The distributed firewall management system must 
provide for safely distributing security policies to all hosts (Ioannidis, 2000). Safety of 
transmission relies heavily on hiding the data or employing some sort of encryption (Murthy, 
1998). Bellovin also incorporates the use of IPSec (Internet Protocol Security) to allow for 
encryption of all traffic between hosts on the corporate network (Bellovin, 1999). This 
policy allows for greater security by hiding all data transmissions which pass between hosts 
which are part of the corporate network. 
2.4.2 ADVANTAGES 
The advantages inherent in a distributed firewall implementation build on the 
strengths and correct the weaknesses of past firewall technologies. Distributed firewalls are 
an integral piece in solving the problems with gateway firewalls while still retaining the 
advantages of this technology (Bellovin, 1999). The following section outlines many of the 
inherent advantages present in a distributed firewall implementation. 
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With each end host possessing its own distributed firewall, the gateway firewall can 
be constructed in such a way as to alleviate it as a congestion point. The throughput of the 
network is no longer constrained by the speed of the gateway firewall (Bellovin, 1999). The 
filtering has instead been delegated to the end hosts and thus the burden placed on the 
gateway firewall is tremendously lessened (Ioannidis, 2000). This alleviation on the gateway 
firewall allows for communication speeds flowing into and out of the corporate network to 
increase and presumably productivity to also potentially increase. The loss of the convoluted 
state of the gateway firewall also diminishes the chance of the network being isolated from 
the Internet due to a single point of failure (Bellovin, 1999). 
The gateway firewall no longer must guess as to what certain traffic entails because 
the firewall at the end host will know exactly how to treat it. Gateway firewalls frequently 
do not have knowledge of what the end host is communicating and must therefore rely on 
externally visible features of various protocols (Bellovin, 1999). Many protocols such as 
FTP are especially troublesome for gateway firewalls due to their dynamic port aggregation. 
The gateway firewall is alleviated of this responsibility because the relevant information to 
make decisions about traffic is present at the decision point-the end host (Ioannidis, 2000). 
This alleviates many of the rules which have traditionally bogged down the gateway firewall 
as well as create a more secure environment since the end host will know exactly what is 
being communicated. 
Distributed firewalls can be used to help protect hosts which are not within the 
physical boundary of the organization (Bellovin, 1999). The old paradigm of all corporate 
users lying within the physical boundaries of the company LAN is being challenged by the 
adoption ofVPNs, telecommuting, as well as mobile and wireless computing (Markham, 
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2001 ). These remote users are allowed access to all or sections of the protected network, so 
it is essential that these remote systems comply with the corporate security policy (Ioannidis, 
2000). The distributed firewall implementation on these remote hosts helps to protect the 
host from outside abuse whether they are connected to the corporate network or not 
(Bellovin, 1999). This helps to secure the remote machine, thereby securing the local 
network from the possibility of a compromised remote computer. 
Policy management for all distributed firewalls can be managed in and distributed 
from a central repository. The central repository is responsible for all management functions 
including policy construction, policy distribution, and audit collection (Payne, 2003). 
Policies for each machine are transferred securely from the management system to each 
individual host machine. Management can also be setup in a hierarchical system to support 
delegation of privileges to other users (Keromytis, 2003). This allows for future growth of 
the network without severely taxing one machine and/or network administrator. 
With distributed firewalls operating on every host, internal hosts are protected from 
actions taken by another internal user. Network administrators understand that the biggest 
threat to the organizational network comes not from without but from within (Markham, 
2001). For this reason, distributed firewalls protect every internal host from every other 
internal host on the corporate LAN regardless of the machine's use or value to the company. 
Also, in the case that the gateway firewall is compromised or bypassed by an attacker, 
internal hosts are still protected from other hosts which the attacker is able to compromise on 
the corporate network. 
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2.4.3 SHORTCOMINGS 
While a distributed firewall implementation possesses many advantages over the 
traditional gateway firewall, there still exist some disadvantages with distributed firewalls. 
Distributed firewall implementations can introduce new security and management problems 
(Xian, 2002). The following section outlines some of the shortcomings associated with 
distributed firewalls along with possible methods to alleviate such shortcomings. 
The implementation of a single policy management system presents a single point of 
failure for the distributed firewall system (Xian, 2002). As it has been throughout computing 
history, centralized management, while offering ease of administration, also offers a single 
point of failure for the entire system. A distributed firewall implementation requires high 
quality administration tools and also places high confidence in these tools (Ioannidis, 2000). 
The key here is to exert painstaking efforts to ensure that the policy management server is as 
secure as possible. Access to the server should be restricted both physically and 
programmatically, and all updates and patches must be kept as current as possible. 
The gateway firewall still offers a superior solution to counteracting the distributed 
denial of service attacks. Gateway firewalls have an advantage over distributed firewalls in 
that they offer aggregation points for traffic into the network and thus are more capable of 
diminishing the effects of a distributed denial of service attack on the corporate network 
(Keromytis, 2003). This advantage also signifies the fact that gateway firewalls are truly 
congestion points for the internal network. Here this congestion point proves to be an 
advantage in reducing traffic on the corporate network, but traffic into and out of the 
corporate network has still been reduced to a standstill. 
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The use of IP Sec to encrypt all traffic on the corporate network presents a problem 
for most network-based intrusion detection systems (Xian, 2002). These network-based 
intrusion detection systems rely on viewing network traffic in order to detect possible threats 
on the corporate network. In distributed firewall implementations where encryption is 
employed to hide data on the corporate network, the data is also hidden from these network-
based intrusion detection systems. A possible solution lies in the ability of each host in the 
distributed firewall implementation to log intrusions and forward them to a central repository 
(Bellovin, 1999). The problem here lies in the ability of the central repository to process and 
correlate all these logs into a coherent analysis of the network. 
2.4.4 IMPLEMENTATION 
The two methods for implementing a distributed firewall infrastructure include 
hardware-based implementation and software-based implementation, both of which have 
their respective advantages and disadvantages. The following section will briefly outline the 
two basic implementation methods for a distributed firewall infrastructure and also offer 
comparisons between the two methods based on advantages and disadvantages. 
2.4.4.1 HARDWARE-BASED 
Hardware-based implementations involve the firewall residing on a separate hardware 
device which is physically connected to the host. The distributed firewall usually resides on 
the network interface card (NIC) where the firewall network security functions are performed 
(Markham, 2001). The NIC possesses its own processor and memory for performing 
distributed firewall functions. 
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2.4.4.2 SOFTWARE-BASED 
Software-based distributed firewall implementations involve the firewall residing on 
and working with the host operating system. Software-based firewalls rely on the host's 
operating system to perform their distributed firewall operations (Markham, 2001 ). The 
software is thus part of the operating system of the machine and does not reside in its own 
memory space. 
2.4.4.3 COMPARISONS 
Both hardware-based and software-based distributed firewall implementations have 
their respective advantages and disadvantages when compared with each other. It is up to the 
organization implementing the distributed firewall infrastructure to make a decision as to 
what aspects are most important to them when evaluating these two basic implementation 
methods. The following section provides a brief comparison on the key points between the 
hardware-based and software-based distributed firewall implementation methods. 
Hardware-based implementations completely separate themselves from the host 
operating system. This allows the firewall device to be completely independent of the host 
operating system and therefore not reliant on a certain operating system (Markham, 2001 ). 
Software-based implementations are dependant on the separate operating systems that each 
and every host is running. Since a software-based distributed firewall implementation is 
reliant on the host operating system, it also fails to satisfy the cornerstone requirement of 
tamper-resistance for all firewalls (Payne, 2001). This is a result of the fact that the firewall 
can be modified in certain ways by the host operating system. For this reason many question 
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whether the firewall in a software-based implementation protects the operating system, or if 
the operating system protects the firewall (Markham, 2001 ). 
Operations performed in hardware are typically much faster than those performed in 
software. Most often the closer one gets to programming at the hardware level the faster the 
operations run due to lack of layers of interpretation. The network interface card has a tight 
processing loop which makes it fast and cheap in terms of processing time (Payne, 2001). 
Software-based distributed firewall implementations run on top of both the operating system 
and the hardware, so the amount of interpretation and therefore processing time is somewhat 
increased. 
Network cards can easily be removed and replaced by a noncompliant card. There is 
no way to effectively stop a user from swapping out a distributed firewall enabled network 
interface card for a card which is not distributed firewall enabled (Payne, 2001). The user 
now has a promiscuous card with which to send whatever traffic desired onto the network. 
Software-based distributed firewalls, though, cannot be removed by the typical user unless 
administrative privileges can be obtained. 
The memory available on most distributed firewall hardware devices is limited and 
does not allow for fine-grained firewall rules. Applications have become increasingly 
complex with such threats as Active-X, JavaScript, and other complex application-level 
protocols (Markham, 2001 ). Since the software-based firewall is implemented as an 
operating system application, it is able to utilize the same memory and processor that the 
operating system itself utilizes. This allows for the potential for much more fine-grained 
protection rules. The network interface card, with its limited memory, is unable to perform 
complex processing, so these operations must be performed at the server or not at all (Payne, 
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2001 ). This causes the distributed firewall implementation to become a chokepoint and thus 
digress back to one of the main drawbacks of gateway firewalls which the distributed firewall 
implementation is attempting to avoid. 
The costs associated with a software-based distributed firewall implementation can be 
significantly less than those associated with hardware. One of the predominant hardware-
based distributed firewall technologies available on the market today is the 3Com Embedded 
Firewall System (Meredith, 2003). The prices for many of the pieces are much more than 
most corporations are willing or able to spend. Network cards cost over two hundred dollars 
and this does not take into account the cost of the software for the policy server (3Com, 
2005). Software-based implementations tend to run much more cheaply if not for free, as 
with the Windows Firewall included with Windows XP (Microsoft, 2004). This tends to be 
much more attractive to corporate board members as well as IT professionals. 
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CHAPTER 3: ROAMING USER-BASED DISTRIBUTED 
FIREWALLS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewalls provide an answer to the problems 
inherent with current distributed firewall research with respect to multi-user systems and 
roaming users within an organization. Though briefly mentioned by Meredith, no details are 
given as to how a Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewall infrastructure would be 
implemented (Meredith, 2003). The rest of this section attempts to answer questions 
regarding the theoretical underpinnings of Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewalls. A 
proof-of-concept implementation, coined Project Stumper, is presented in a subsequent 
section. 
3.2 GOALS 
A Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewall implementation is designed to fulfill the 
following goals: 
1. Provide an organizational-wide deployment of a distributed firewall 
infrastructure. This implies that the implementation will retain all the inherent 
advantages associated with a traditional distributed firewall infrastructure. 
2. Provide solutions for the roaming user as well as multi-user machines. The 
infrastructure must extend the concepts of a distributed firewall infrastructure to 
accommodate roaming users and multi-user machines. 
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3. Provide secure authentication of users when receiving firewall configurations at 
logon. Since the firewall configurations will be distributed by user instead of by 
machine, secure authentication of users must occur before receiving firewall policy 
updates at the machine the user is utilizing. 
4. Provide for centralized manageability of each user's firewall configuration. 
Centralized management must accommodate separate firewall configurations for each 
user in the organization as opposed to each machine. 
3.3 CHALLENGES 
Many of the goals set forth above come equipped with underlying challenges which 
must be alleviated before these goals can be met. The following is a list of these challenges 
and the possible solutions. 
3.3.1 SHOULD A HARDWARE-BASED OR SOFTWARE-BASED APPROACH BE 
IMPLEMENTED? 
Hardware and software-based implementations each provide both advantages and 
disadvantages to contend with. These points of distinction have been described in great 
detail above. While hardware-based approaches offer some security advantages over 
software-based solutions, the costs incurred from the use of hardware-based solutions deter 
all but the most security-conscientious organizations from implementing hardware-based 
solutions. Software-based solutions also offer the most flexibility and options as these 
solutions are not hindered by a limited amount of available memory in which to process and 
execute. 
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3.3.2 How CAN USERS BE SECURELY AUTHENTICATED TO RECEIVE THEIR 
FIREWALL CONFIGURATIONS? 
Authentication of users is a key aspect when it comes to a Roaming User-Based 
Distributed Firewall implementation. Since the configurations of the individual firewalls are 
no longer restricted to a specific machine, a secure and reliable method for user 
authentication is needed prior to the dissemination of firewall configuration parameters. 
Trusted third party authentication has provided a satisfactory form of user 
authentication for secure environments for quite some time. The idea involves a trusted third 
party who is used to both verify a user to a centralized management repository as well as 
provide verification in the opposite direction. The Kerberos protocol has provided a secure 
third-party authentication implementation for years and can be used as a way to verify user 
identities during logon (Kerberos, 2005). 
Even the best, most foolproof authentication technology in the world cannot 
compensate for unwise actions by a user on the network. Though it has been mentioned 
countless times before in various places, the time should be taken again to instill the fact that 
users need to be educated in matters involving them and security. The whole system will fall 
apart if a user writes his or her password underneath the keyboard. 
3.3.3 How CAN THE MYRIAD OF FIREWALL CONFIGURATIONS BE SECURELY 
MANAGED IN A CENTRALIZED REPOSITORY? 
Management of computing services, including security, has been and will always 
prove to be a daunting task. The ideas set forth in the above literature demonstrate that a 
distributed firewall infrastructure should be centrally managed. A Roaming User-Based 
31 
Distributed Firewall infrastructure should keep this management aspect. A client-server 
environment in which all policies are kept within a secure server environment and only 
disseminated to the proper user upon successful logon is a valid solution. This allows an 
administrator to perform all management tasks from one centralized location without 
compromising security. 
Most organizations employ more users than can be successfully managed by one 
server and by one administrator. Many organizations employ a distributed infrastructure in 
which many different servers are used to validate user logon credentials. In this situation, the 
Kerberos protocol again comes in handy as it can be used to delegate authority. A tree-like 
delegation of authority structure can be setup with subordinate administrators below a top-
level administrator. Also, separate machines can be setup in this same tree-like structure to 
alleviate the workload from one credential server. Kerberos can then be used to validate both 
these lower-level administrators as well as machines. 
3.4 ARCHITECTURE 
Figure 1 provides a sequence diagram describing the high-level exchanges in a 
Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewall Infrastructure. 
User 
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Operating System Credential Server 
Logon (1) 
User Logon (6) 
.......................................................... . ........................................................... . 
Encrypted Logon (2) 
Encrypted Administrator Script (3) 
Request Configuration Script (4) 
Configuration Script (5) 
Figure 1: Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewall Architecture 
The first step involves a user logon at a client machine(l). This machine passes this 
logon information to the operating system which then begins the Kerberos authentication 
procedure with the credential server. After the Kerberos authentication has completed, the 
operating system transfers the user's logon information to the credential server (2). This 
logon information has been encrypted with a private key which both the client machine and 
credential server have agreed upon as set forth by the Kerberos protocol. 
After the credential server has received the logon request from the user, it first must 
send a default logon script which will grant administrator privileges on the local box (3). 
This must be performed because the local firewall can only be configured by someone with 
local administrator privileges for obvious security concerns. If local administrator privileges 
were not a prerequisite for configuring the local firewall then anyone at the computer would 
be able to modify the firewall. This scenario is in strict violation of the security principle of 
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tamper-resistance (US DOD, 1983). Since this script will contain the usemame and 
password of a local administrator, the script should be camouflaged in some way as it passes 
over the network. This can be accomplished using various methods including encryption, 
hash, or compilation of the script itself. 
After local administrator privileges have been acquired on the client machine, firewall 
credentials for the individual user must be downloaded from the credential server. The 
administrator script requests the firewall configuration script based on the user's logon 
information ( 4). This configuration script will then be transferred to the client machine to be 
used to configure the firewall according to the policy approved for that user (5). Because the 
configuration script does not contain any security information, camouflaging of the script is 
not necessarily needed. After the firewall has been configured, the user is granted logon 
rights to the machine providing the user has access rights (6). 
More specifics as to how the overall process occurs will be covered in the section 
containing the proof-of-concept application named Project Stumper. The above explanation 
is provided primarily as a framework for those who wish to implement the concept 
themselves using differing methods compared to those which will be discussed in Project 
Stumper below. 
3.5 ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES 
In order for the entire system to operate effectively and as efficiently as possible, 
organizational roles within the system must be adequately defined. The purpose of this 
system is to provide a distributed firewall infrastructure for every machine in the 
organization which is not bounded by machine. This involves maintaining credentials in a 
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centralized repository, disseminating those credentials at the proper time, and ensuring those 
credentials will be implemented at the end hosts. For this reason, the following three 
organizational roles have been outlined. 
The user plays the most obvious role within the organization. Each employee within 
the organization who utilizes a client machine qualifies as a user. The user's purpose within 
the system is bounded by their respective policy. The user initiates the policy configuration 
with a logon and then uses the resulting policy at the machine which he or she is using. The 
user is therefore the customer in the overall Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewall 
infrastructure. 
The next organizational role is defined as the policy creator. This role is in charge of 
developing firewall configuration policies for each user within the organization. The 
development of policy involves much more than a technical knowledge of the policy 
implementation method. The policy creator must perform interviews with employees and 
managers alike to decide what types of access should be granted to users which are necessary 
for their daily work. Decisions must then be made by the policy creator as to the most 
appropriate configurations per user based on these various interviews. Lastly, the policy 
creator must be able to adequately translate these necessary access rights into the 
technological language used to configure the user's firewall. 
The final role within the system is the administrator. An administrator possesses the 
necessary rights to implement the policies configured by the policy creator. The 
administrator also is able to organize the various configurations on the centralized policy 
server to allow for greatest effectiveness and manageability. 
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The three roles outlined above are not a necessary component of a Roaming User-
Based Distributed Firewall infrastructure, but are provided only as a guideline for ease of 
implementation within the organization. The policy creator and administrator roles can 
involve more than one individual implemented under a Kerberos trust type system or just one 
individual per role. In smaller organizations, the policy creator and administrator may even 
be the same individual performing both roles. The overall concept is to demonstrate that 
well-defined roles will ease deployment and maintainability within the organization. 
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CHAPTER 4: PROJECT STUMPER 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Project Stumper is a proof-of-concept implementation of the Roaming User-Based 
Distributed Firewall infrastructure. Project Stumper attempts to provide a real-world 
example for other developers to use, extend, and/or develop their own implementations from. 
Project Stumper is not intended to be an absolute implementation in the area of Roaming 
User-Based Distributed Firewalls; there are still areas which could be vastly improved and 
expanded. The intention of the project is to provide a proof-of-concept that the ideas from 
the above paper can be implemented by the corporate network. 
4.2 IMPLEMENTATION 
Implementation of Project Stumper involves the use of several software components 
from more than one vendor with various configurations. The following sections describe 
these various software components as well as some reasons for their use. Advantages and 
disadvantages to both the software used as well as the approach are also offered at the end of 
the section. 
4.2.1 SOFTWARE-BASED 
Project Stumper incorporates a software-based implementation method as opposed to 
a hardware-based implementation. The software used consists almost exclusively of 
products from Microsoft Corporation with the exception of one. Advantages and 
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disadvantages with the approach as well as with the choice of software will be discussed 
later. 
4.2.2 MICROSOFT WINDOWS FAMILY NETWORK IMPLEMENTATION 
Project Stumper incorporates the use of the Microsoft Windows operating system 
environment as a platform for Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewalls. The following 
subsections list the Microsoft software used as well as the primary sections used within the 
software packages. 
4.2.2.1 MICROSOFT WINDOWS SERVER 2003 
Microsoft Windows Server 2003 is the most recent server platform provided by 
Microsoft. This server environment provides a means for centralized management of all 
computers located on a corporate LAN or within its policy reach. Though Project Stumper 
utilizes Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition, the components used are 
available in any edition of Microsoft Windows Server 2003. These components are also 
available within any edition of Microsoft Windows Server 2000, but the server will need to 
make use of a separate host-based firewall implementation as Microsoft Windows Server 
2000 does not include a host-based firewall implementation built into the operating system. 
The primary component within Microsoft Windows Server 2003 incorporated by 
Project Stumper is Active Directory Services. Microsoft describes Active Directory Services 
as the following: 
Active Directory services is completely integrated with Windows 2000 Server and 
offers the hierarchical view, extensibility, scalability, and distributed security required 
by all business customers. Active Directory services allows administrators, 
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developers, and end users to gain access to a directory service that is seamlessly 
integrated with both Internet and intranet environments. Active Directory services is a 
critical part of the distributed system. It allows administrators and end users to use the 
directory service as a source of information as well as an administrative service. 
(Madden, 2000) 
For the purposes of Project Stumper, Active Directory Services provides manageability of 
every client within the corporate domain policy. This will provide a single point of policy 
management for each piece utilized within Project Stumper. 
4.2.2.2 MICROSOFT WINDOWS XP PROFESSIONAL WITH SERVICE PACK 2 
Microsoft Windows XP Professional is the most recent client operating system 
environment provided by Microsoft. This operating system was originally released in 2001 
as a desktop client operating system. In fall 2004 Service Pack 2 was released for XP which 
included many security upgrades. Project Stumper has been implemented using a version of 
Windows XP with Service Pack 2 installed to allow for security benefits for client 
computers. 
The primary piece within Windows XP Professional utilized by Project Stumper is 
the host-based firewall named Windows Firewall. This firewall is natively present on all 
Windows XP Professional installations. This firewall provides for added security for each 
machine on the network by placing a barrier between the client and both the internal and 
external networks. 
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4.2.2.3 WINDOWS SCRIPTING HOST 
The Windows Scripting Host (WSH) is a scripting engine which is present on every 
computer running Windows XP. WSH allows different types of scripts to be run on the 
machine including Visual Basic script (vbscript) and Jscript. Project Stumper utilizes the 
WSH by incorporating it to programmatically alter the state of the firewall for the access 
restrictions assigned to each user. 
4.2.3 AUTOIT VERSION 3 
Project Stumper incorporates AutoIT for use as its mechanism for script 
dissemination. AutoIT is an opensource scripting program which can be implemented by the 
Microsoft Server platform as a means for disseminating login script parameters. AutoIT only 
needs to be installed on the Server machine and not each client computer. AutoIT allows the 
script to run other programs within the context of another user. This allows the script to 
update the Windows Firewall, which can only be modified by a member of the 
Administrators group. 
Another key feature of AutoIT is credential hiding. AutoIT allows scripts to be 
compiled into a standalone executable file. This compilation allows for administrator 
information to be hidden in the compiled script. This provides for security from anyone 
sniffing traffic on the LAN. 
4.2.4 IMPLEMENTATION DESCRIPTION 
Project Stumper utilizes all the above components to implement a Roaming User-
Based Distributed Firewall environment. 
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The entire process begins with the user attempting to login to the corporate LAN. 
Microsoft Windows Server 2003 provides for secure logon of each machine and user 
utilizing the Kerberos 5 protocol (Kerberos, 2005). Once the user has been authenticated to 
the server, user-specific credentials can be uploaded to the client from the server. Included 
among these user-specific credentials can be a logon script which can be used to configure 
the machine specifically for the user who has logged in. Project Stumper utilizes this logon 
script to upload a second WSH script which configures a host-based firewall at the machine 
which the user is logging in from. This script utilizes the windows scripting host (WSH) 
mentioned above. Project Stumper utilizes Visual Basic script as its language, though Jscript 
could also be utilized. 
Modifying the Windows Firewall requires local administrator privileges on the box 
which is being configured. VBScript can be used to pass these credentials to the client 
machine, but would then pose a gaping security hole as the credentials would be passed 
across the network in plaintext. Also, when the credentials for the administrator account 
used are changed, each logon script for each user would need to be modified. For this 
reason, AutoIT was employed as a scripting mechanism for passing user credentials. AutoIT 
is an opensource scripting tool and its latest release is version 3. One of the advantages of 
using AutoIT is that once the script has been developed AutoIT offers the ability to compile 
the script into an executable. This allows the developer to include administrator user 
information without the threat that it can be seen as it passes over the wire. AutoIT also 
offers for ease of management. AutoIT only needs to be installed on the server computer 
where the scripts are housed and not on each client computer. Also, the development of 
Project Stumper has allowed one AutoIT script to call all other VB startup scripts. When the 
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administrator credentials are changed, this provides for ease of management as only one 
script needs to be changed and not each and every startup script for each user. 
The login script thus involves a multipart process. First, the user is authenticated on 
the network as a valid user as described above. Next, the default AutoIT script with 
administrator credentials compiled within it is passed to the client machine. This script gives 
the login script administrator privileges on the box before calling another vbscript which is 
used to configure the box specific to the client. This vbscript filename is passed as a 
parameter to the AutoIT script. Since this process takes a little time, the Group Policy on the 
domain does not allow the user to interact with the desktop until the entire logon process has 
completed. The end result is a client machine that is configured for the specific user who is 
logged in. 
The logo ff process improves network security by closing all ports on the client 
machine. The default Group Policy for the entire domain runs a default logoff script for each 
user in the domain. This script is the same AutoIT script with the administrator credentials 
compiled therein. The parameter is a vbscript which is the same for each user. This script 
closes all ports on the client machine. This provides the greatest deal of security as most 
client machines do not need ports open when no one is logged into them. This logo ff process 
can also be divided using group policy so that some machines keep certain ports open when 
users log off from them. This would be useful for a server computer which must be available 
to provide certain services at all times. 
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4.2.5 ADVANTAGES 
Many of the advantages associated with Project Stumper coincide with those 
advantages of software-based distributed firewall implementations which are listed above. 
First, the client firewall cannot be removed by just removing a network card. Since the 
firewall in included in the operating system, it is tougher to remove. Second, the memory 
available on the client machine is quite extensive and allows for many more rules for traffic 
which is both allowed and disallowed. One of the main advantages mentioned above is that 
of cost. Since the firewall is included with Windows XP, there are no added software costs 
associated with the implementation. Most corporations today employ Microsoft as their 
desktop operating system, so the cost for the operating system is already included with 
company expenditures. 
With Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 2, the ability to assign firewall 
configurations to certain groups of users using group policy is included. The problem lies in 
the ability to assign a different firewall configuration for each user in the domain. Project 
Stumper alleviates this problem by allowing for separate firewall configurations for each and 
every user within the corporation. 
Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 2 provides only for default firewall 
configuration of client machines using Group Policy. This means that if a computer has 
more than one network connection, the firewall configurations for each connection will be 
the same. Project Stumper allows for separate firewall configurations for each network 
connection on the client machine. This allows one network connection to allow different 
types of traffic than another on the same machine. 
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4.2.6 DISADVANTAGES 
Project Stumper also shares many of the disadvantages associated with software-
based distributed firewall implementations which are listed above. First, the firewall is 
dependant on the operating system since it is a part of it. This means that if the operating 
system can be compromised, then the firewall configuration also can. Second, operations 
performed in software take more time than those performed in hardware due to multiple 
layers of abstraction. Also, since the number and complexity of rules can be greater due to 
greater memory capacity, this also contributes to the firewall running more slowly. 
While AutoIT allows for compilation of administrator credentials, the vbscript used to 
configure the firewall is still transferred in plaintext. While this does not pose any major 
security risk since no user information is compromised, it does allow the network attacker to 
see how the firewall will be configured. This will allow the attacker to better organize an 
attack against the client machine. 
The vbscript used for firewall configuration does not provide any means for 
verification. This leaves the door open to a man-in-the-middle attack on the client machine. 
An attacker could wait for the AutoIT script to give the client machine administrative 
privileges and then intercept the vbscript used to configure the firewall. The attacker could 
then send the client machine his or her own firewall configuration script to allow for his own 
modification of the firewall. 
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CHAPTER 5: SYSTEM TESTING 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
While Project Stumper may look good on paper, the following section provides 
various tests to verify the statements made above. These tests are by no means a thorough 
examination of the system and are provided solely as a means for testing some aspects of the 
system. The various tools used as well as the tests which utilized these tools are described 
briefly in the following section. 
5.2 TOOLS USED 
While there are many tools available for security testing, the following were chosen 
due to their reputation and respect from those within the security community. These tools 
have been thoroughly tested throughout the years and have proven a reliable source for 
verifying various security aspects of a system and its communications. 
5.2.1 NMAP 
Nmap is likely the most well-known security tool today as well as one of the first port 
scanning tools ever available. It's easy-to-use command-line interface allows most anyone to 
employ it as a security verification mechanism. Nmap has gone through various revisions 
and is currently in build 3.75. Nmap has also been ported to many different operating 
systems including UNIX, Linux, Solaris, Windows, and many more. A graphical version of 
the tool has also been developed for command-line inept individuals on a Windows machine. 
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More information on Nmap can be found at its website which is listed in the References 
section at the end of this paper (Fyodor, 2005). 
5.2.2 NESSUS (NEWT) 
Nessus has gained popularity in recent years as an all-encompassing security tool 
which contains probes for many known vulnerabilities. Nessus uses many different weapons 
in its arsenal, including Nmap, to probe a machine for many different vulnerabilities. Nessus 
provides a server daemon and a graphical client component which connects to the server and 
runs the various tests before displaying the results to the user in an easily understandable 
graphical layout. The client does not need to be running on the same machine and can 
employ a secure channel to the server over a network. The server is written to run on a Linux 
platform, while the client has been written for both Linux as well as Windows platforms. 
Newt is a commercially available version ofNessus which has been ported to run 
completely within a Windows environment. Many corporations and other entities do not 
employ Linux machines, yet need to utilize Nessus to help verify the security of machines on 
their respective LANs. For this reason Newt was constructed as a Nessus equivalent which 
runs completely, both server and client, within a Windows environment. More information 
on both Nessus as well as Newt can be found at the Nessus website which is listed in the 
References section at the end of this paper (Tenable, 2005). 
5.2.3 ETHEREAL 
Ethereal is a well-known and respected packet capturing tool used to analyze data as 
it passes from one host to another. Ethereal is capable of capturing any and all data which 
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passes over the wire (or in the air) between the host it is running on and another host whether 
the traffic is intended for the host it is installed on or not. Ethereal offers an easy to use 
graphical interface which catalogs the transmissions according to various attributes of the 
data including sender address, recipient address, application protocol, etc. More information 
on Ethereal can be found at its website which is listed in the References section at the end of 
this paper (Ethereal, 2005). 
5.3 TESTING 
While an application can never be proven to be totally secure, testing of the 
application can help to add credibility to the security it does offer. The following section 
provides a summary of the tests which were run against a client involved in Project Stumper 
using the various tools described above. 
5.3.1 NMAP SCANS 
The following section provides command-line segments as well as explanations of 
various nmap scans performed on a client which is part of Project Stumper. These scans help 
to display ports which are open on a Windows XP client both when Project Stumper is 
enabled as well as when it is disabled on the machine. 
5.3.1.1 PROJECT STUMPER ENABLED AND USER1 LOGGED IN 
The following command line excerpt shows an nmap scan with Project Stumper 
enabled and userl logged in. 
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C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator>nmap -PO -0 192.168.0.106 
Starting nmap 3.75 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap at 2005-01-23 14:12 Central 
Standard Time 
Warning: OS detection will be MUCH less reliable because we did not find at lea 
st 1 open and 1 closed TCP port 
Interesting ports on 192.168.0.106: 
(The 1661 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered) 
PORT STATE SERVICE 
913/tcp open unknown 
3389/tcp open ms-term-serv 
MAC Address: OO:OC:29:B6:4C:E6 (VMware) 
Device type: general purpose 
Running: Microsoft Windows 2003/.NETINT/2K/XP 
OS details: Microsoft Windows Server 2003, Microsoft Windows 2000 SP3 
Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 33.169 seconds 
Figure 2: Nmap scan with Project Stumper enabled and userl logged in 
The above configuration has been setup so that userl has two open ports - 913 and 3389. 
These two separate ports were used to show an example of ports open for both a Microsoft as 
well as a non-Microsoft program on the machine. Port 913 TCP is a Kerberos port for a 
program named Scout which can be used for encrypted remote connections with a network. 
Port 3389 TCP is the port used for the Remote Desktop program which is present on all 
installations of Microsoft Windows XP Professional. These programs represent programs 
which a typical user might need openings for in a firewall in order to use over a network. 
The main fact to notice from the scan is that only these two ports are open and no others, and 
also that these ports could be closed and/or others opened depending on the policy of the 
corporate network and also the needs of the specific user. The scan also shows that although 
nmap was capable of guessing the operating system of the machine as a Microsoft derivative, 
it was incorrect in its guess of the specific OS present on the machine. 
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5.3.1.2 PROJECT STUMPER ENABLED AND USER1 LOGGED OUT 
The following command line excerpt shows an nmap scan with Project Stumper 
enabled and userl logged out. 
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator>nmap -PO -0 192.168.0.106 
Starting nmap 3.75 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap at 2005-01-23 14:19 Central 
Standard Time 
Warning: OS detection will be MUCH less reliable because we did not find at lea 
st 1 open and 1 closed TCP port 
All 1663 scanned ports on 192.168.0.106 are: filtered 
Too many fingerprints match this host to give specific OS details 
Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 382.618 seconds 
Figure 3: Nmap scan with Project Stumper enabled and userl logged out 
The above example shows that all ports are closed on the client machine when the user is not 
logged in. A separate script is run when users logo ff their machines and therefore separate 
firewall configurations can be made at this time. Since most users do not need access to their 
machines during non-working hours, the machine can be completely closed off to the rest of 
the corporate network. If a user did need access to certain applications, such as Remote 
Desktop, this could also be programmed in. The idea is that when the computer is not being 
utilized it can be closed down to attacks which may originate on the corporate network. 
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5.3.1.3 PROJECT STUMPER DISABLED AND USER1 LOGGED IN 
The following command line excerpt shows an nmap scan with Project Stumper 
disabled and userl logged in. 
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator>nmap -PO -0 192.168.0.106 
Starting nmap 3.75 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap at 2005-01-23 14:15 Central 
Standard Time 
Interesting ports on CLIENTl (192.168.0.106): 
(The 1658 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed) 
PORT STATE SERVICE 
135/tcp open msrpc 
139/tcp open netbios-ssn 
445/tcp open microsoft-ds 
913/tcp open unknown 
3389/tcp open ms-term-serv 
MAC Address: OO:OC:29:B6:4C:E6 (VMware) 
Device type: general purpose 
Running: Microsoft Windows 2003/.NETINT/2K/XP 
OS details: Microsoft Windows 2003 Server or XP SP2 
Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 26.180 seconds 
Figure 4: Nmap scan with Project Stumper disabled and userl logged in 
The above example helps to show the amount of security holes which are available when 
Project Stumper is not implemented. Since this client machine has just a base installation of 
Windows XP installed, the number of application ports is minimal but the number of possible 
application ports will only increase with the amount of applications installed on the machine. 
A key area of concern involves the TCP ports 135, 139, and 445 which are file and print 
sharing ports which can divulge much information aboutthe machine and also allow the 
machine to be more easily compromised. It should also be noted that this scan was much 
closer on matching the operating system and was even correct on the service pack release 
thereof. 
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5.3.1.4 PROJECT STUMPER DISABLED AND USER1 LOGGED OUT 
The following command line excerpt shows an nmap scan with Project Stumper 
disabled and user 1 logged out. 
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator>nmap -PO -0 192.168.0.106 
Starting nmap 3.75 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap at 2005-01-23 14:16 Central 
Standard Time 
Interesting ports on CLIENTl (192.168.0.106): 
(The 1659 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed) 
PORT STATE SERVICE 
135/tcp open msrpc 
139/tcp open netbios-ssn 
445/tcp open microsoft-ds 
3389/tcp open ms-term-serv 
MAC Address: OO:OC:29:B6:4C:E6 (VMware) 
Device type: general purpose 
Running: Microsoft Windows 2003/.NETINT/2K/XP 
OS details: Microsoft Windows 2003 Server or XP SP2 
Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 5.338 seconds 
Figure 5: Nmap scan with Project Stumper disabled and userl logged out 
As can be seen in the above example, the same ports which are open when the user is logged 
onto a machine without Project Stumper enabled are also open when the user is logged off. 
Without the ability to close ports when the user is logged off, critical applications are left 
wide open to attack at all times the computer is turned on. 
5.3.2 NEWT SCANS 
The following section provides a brief explanation of reports available for viewing in 
Appendix B constructed by Newt pertaining to a client machine within Project Stumper. 
These scans help to display vulnerabilities which are present on a Windows XP client both 
when Project Stumper is enabled as well as when it is disabled on the machine. When the 
scans were performed, Newt was updated with all available pluggins and also was configured 
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to attempt to use all available vulnerability possibilities including those in the dangerous 
category - DOS attacks, etc. 
5.3.2.1 PROJECT STUMPER ENABLED AND USER1 EITHER LOGGED IN OR OUT 
The first two Newt scans available in Appendix B were performed on a Windows XP 
client machine which had Project Stumper enabled and userl both logged in and logged off 
of the machine respectively. As can be seen, not much information can be garnered from 
these two reports as Newt was not able to find any vulnerabilities. From the Nmap scan, the 
knowledge that ports 3389 and 913 are open when userl is logged in shows that Newt's port 
scanning capabilities are not as robust as that ofNmap's, although a special Nmap scan was 
performed. The main point to see is that when Project Stumper is enabled on the client, there 
are no holes which Newt is capable of finding. 
5.3.2.2 PROJECT STUMPER DISABLED AND USER1 EITHER LOGGED IN OR OUT 
The third and fourth scans available in Appendix B were performed on a Windows 
XP client machine which did NOT have Project Stumper enabled. Though there are slight 
differences between them, scans from when userl was both logged in and logged off show 
many vulnerabilities to contend with. The main points to notice is that Newt found that the 
critical file and printer sharing ports are open - 135, 137, 139, and 445. Using these ports as 
well as others Newt was capable of garnering much information about the machine including, 
but not limited to, the following: 
• LAN Manager Version: Windows 2000 LAN Manager 
• Operating System: Microsoft Windows XP SP2 
• SMB Domain Name: EXAMPLE 
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• Client NetBIOS Name: CLIENT! 
Another critical flaw included the ability for Newt to connect to the IPC$ share using a null 
sess10n. 
The main point to take from the Newt Scans performed above is that a client machine 
employing Project Stumper is much more secure than a client which is not. The above 
machines have a base installation, so as more and more applications are installed on the 
clients more and more application ports will be open to compromise. A machine utilizing 
Project Stumper, though, will always have the same amount of open application ports which 
is consistent with the user's needs as mandated by the domain policy. 
5.3.3 ETHEREAL PACKET CAPTURES 
The following section provides a brief explanation pertaining to reports available in 
Appendix C which were constructed by Ethereal during a packet capture on the Project 
Stumper enabled network. These scans display exactly what was passed between the server 
and client machines, both part of Project Stumper, during the logon and logoff ofuserl. The 
packets available in C.1 and C.2 both show that the firewall configuration scripts are passed 
over the network in the clear. This means that an attacker on the local corporate network 
who is capable of capturing this communication will know how the firewall is configured for 
that particular machine. While the credentials for the local Administrator are compiled in the 
Auto IT script and are not decipherable off the network line, these configuration parameters 
do pose a security vulnerability for Project Stumper. This topic is discussed in the following 
section under Future Work. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
6.1 SUMMARY 
The objectives of this paper were to develop a methodology for a Roaming User-
Based Distributed Firewall implementation and also to demonstrate one sample 
implementation of this methodology. 
Security concerns associated with the local LAN were researched and described in 
detail. These security threats included malicious code, insider threats, mobile computing 
(VPN' s ), Business Partners, and Wireless Vulnerabilities. These threats helped to paint a 
picture for exactly what firewall technologies are contending with and the problems they are 
expected to alleviate. 
Examples of previous firewall research and implementations were also researched 
and described. These previous firewall technologies included network-based (gateway) 
firewalls, host-based firewalls, and distributed firewalls. This previous research provided a 
foundation for extending the ideas therein. 
A framework for a Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewall implementation was 
both proposed and described. This included the goals which are strived for, the challenges 
therein, the architecture thereof, and the organizational roles it creates. This framework 
provided a basic outline for any Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewall implementation to 
be implemented using whatever platforms and technologies required. 
Project Stumper, one example of a Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewall 
Implementation, was offered as a proof-of-concept. While Project Stumper is not ready for 
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implementation on the corporate LAN, it does provide an example from which to gather 
knowledge. The software and implementation procedures used therein were described with 
respect to Project Stumper in detail. Also, the advantages and disadvantages with Project 
Stumper were outlined at the end of the section. 
6.2 FUTURE WORK 
While this paper has provided an initial methodology and implementation for the 
Roaming User-Based Distributed Firewall, there still exist many areas of future work. 
Following are some such areas which need to be improved in the research outlined above. 
Total hiding of all script information would allow for greater security from network 
browsers. This can be implemented using various methods, two of which are discussed here. 
First, the entire network could implement an IP Sec communication policy. This would not 
only solve the problem of the script being viewable on the line, but would keep anything else 
from being viewable also. This setup would also force all communications to be routed 
through a server and therefore negates the effects of peer-to-peer connections. 
Implementation details for implementing IPSec within a Windows domain are available in 
many places on the Internet and can be viewed in a white paper referenced at the end of this 
manuscript (Dixon, 2003). 
Another method for hiding the firewall configuration script contents is by using 
compiled executables using the Microsoft .NET Framework instead of the Windows 
Scripting Host. These executables would compile all data in the logon script so the network 
observer would not see it passing by in plaintext. 
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The .NET Framework also provides for code signing which would allow the login 
scripts to be signed with the public key of an administrator in the domain so that these 
executables could be verified at the client machines. This would solve the problems 
associated with the man-in-the-middle attack listed above. The problem with the .NET 
Framework lies with the dissemination of the .NET Framework to each client machine which 
is needed to run the code. The network administrator would have to ensure that each client 
machine has the .NET Framework installed. 
APPENDIX A: SCRIPT CODE 
A.1 AUTOIT SCRIPT 
$user = "Administrator" 
$domain = "example.com" 
$pass = "password" 
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$runCommand = "wscript.exe " & $CmdLine[l) 
RunAsSet($user, $domain, $pass) 
RunWait($runCommand,"", @SW_HIDE) 
RunAsSet () 






NAME = 0 
ADDRESS = 1 
Main() 
Sub Main () 
Dim NetSharingManager 
Set NetSharingManager = Wscript.CreateObject("HNetCfg.HNetShare.l") 
If(getAllConnections(NetSharingManager, "Local Area Connection") 
False) Then 
WScript.echo("Unable to retrieve all connections.") 
End If 
End Sub 
Function getAllConnections(manager, arg) 
Dim returnArgument 






Set allConnections manager.EnumEveryConnection 
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If(allConnections.Count > 0) Then 
For Each item In allConnections 
Set connection = 
manager.INetSharingConfigurationForINetConnection(item) 
Set connectionProperties = 
manager.NetConnectionProps(item) 
If(StrComp(Ucase(arg),Ucase(connectionProperties.Name)) 
= 0) Then 









Set object = connection.AddPortMapping ( + 






















NAME = 0 
ADDRESS = 1 
Main() 
Sub Main () 
Dim NetSharingManager 
Dim arguments 
Set NetSharingManager Wscript.CreateObject("HNetCfg.HNetShare.1") 
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If(getAllConnections(NetSharingManager, "Local Area Connection") 
False) Then 
WScript.echo("Unable to retrieve all connections.") 
End If 
End Sub 
Function getAllConnections(manager, arg) 
Dim returnArgument 




Dim item, item2 
Dim ports 
Set allConnections = manager.EnumEveryConnection 
If(allConnections.Count > 0) Then 
For Each item In allConnections 
Set connection = 
manager.INetSharingConfigurationForINetConnection(item) 
Set connectionProperties = 
manager.NetConnectionProps(item) 
If(Ucase(arg) = Ucase(connectionProperties.Name)) Then 














APPENDIX 8: NEWT SCAN REPORTS 
8.1 NEWT SCAN WITH PROJECT STUMPER ENABLED AND USER1 
LOGGED IN 
Tenable NeWT Security Reports 
Start Time: Sun Jan 23 14:52:17 2005 Finish Time: Sun Jan 23 14:52:34 2005 
192.168.0.106 
No Vulnerability Found 
8.2 NEWT SCAN WITH PROJECT STUMPER ENABLED AND USER1 
LOGGED OUT 
Tenable NeWT Security Reports 
Start Time: Sun Jan 23 14:58:20 2005 Finish Time: Sun Jan 23 14:58:36 2005 
192.168.0.106 
No Vulnerability Found 
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8.3 NEWT SCAN WITH PROJECT STUMPER DISABLED AND USER1 
LOGGED IN 
Tenable NeWT Security Reports 








6 Open Ports, 15 Notes, 4 Infos, 1 Holes. 
192.168.0.106 
Y,Port is open 
Plugin ID: 11219 
[Return to top] 
~A 'rfpoison' packet has been sent to the remote host. 
This packet is supposed to crash the 'services.exe' process, 
rendering the system instable. 
If you see that this attack was successful, have a look 
at this page : 
http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/0231/4/57 .ASP 
CVE : CVE-1999-0980 
BID: 754 
Plugin ID : 10204 
Y,Port is open 
Plugin ID : 11219 
Y,An SMB server is running on this port 






,!jJPort is open 
Plugin ID: 11219 
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,!jJA CIFS server is running on this port 
Plugin ID : 11011 
SJThe remote native lan manager is : Windows 2000 LAN 
Manager 
The remote Operating System is : Windows 5 .1 
The remote SMB Domain Name is : EXAMPLE 
Plugin ID : 10785 
SJit was possible to log into the remote host using a NULL 
session. 
The concept of a NULL session is to provide a null usemame 
and 
a null password, which grants the user the 'guest' access 
To prevent null sessions, see MS KB Article Q143474 (NT 4.0) 
and 
Q246261 (Windows 2000). 
Note that this won't completely disable null sessions, but will 
prevent them from connecting to IPC$ 
Please see http://msgs.securepoint.com/cgi-bin/get/nessus-
0204/50/l .html 
All the smb tests will be done as "/" in domain EXAMPLE 
CVE: CAN-1999-0504, CAN-1999-0506, CVE-2000-0222, 
CAN-1999-0505, CAN-2002-1117 
BID : 494, 990, 11199 
Plugin ID : 10394 
SJPort is open 
Plugin ID: 11219 
~The Terminal Services are enabled on the remote host. 
general/udp 
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Terminal Services allow a Windows user to remotely obtain 
a graphical login (and therefore act as a local user on the 
remote host). 
If an attacker gains a valid login and password, he may 
be able to use this service to gain further access 
on the remote host. An attacker may also use this service 
to mount a dictionnary attack against the remote host to try 
to log in remotely. 
Note that RDP (the Remote Desktop Protocol) is vulnerable 
to Man-in-the-middle attacks, making it easy for attackers to 
steal the credentials of legitimates users by impersonating the 
Windows server. 
Solution : Disable the Terminal Services if you do not use 
them, and 
do not allow this service to run across the internet 
Risk factor : Medium 
CVE: CVE-2001-0540 
BID: 3099, 7258 
Plugin ID : 10940 
g.Port is open 
Plugin ID: 11219 
g.For your information, here is the traceroute to 192.168.0.106 : 
192.168.0.37 
192.168.0.106 
Plugin ID : l 0287 
)(The remote host is vulnerable to an 'Etherleak' -
general/icmp the remote ethemet driver seems to leak bits of the 
content of the memory of the remote operating system. 
Note that an attacker may take advantage of this flaw 
general/tcp 
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Solution : Contact your vendor for a fix 
Risk factor : High 
CVE : CAN-2003-0001 
BID: 6535 
Plugin ID: 11197 
4l The remote host answers to an ICMP timestamp request. This 
allows an attacker 
to know the date which is set on your machine. 
This may help him to defeat all your time based authentication 
protocols. 
Solution : filter out the ICMP timestamp requests (13), and 
the outgoing ICMP 
timestamp replies (14). 
Risk factor : Low 
CVE: CAN-1999-0524 
Plugin ID : 10114 
8'Here is the route recorded between 192.168.0.37 and 
192.168.0.106: 
192.168.0.106. 
Plugin ID : 12264 
£The remote host does not discard TCP SYN packets which 
have the FIN flag set. 
Depending on the kind of firewall you are using, an 







Solution : Contact your vendor for a patch 
Risk factor : Medium 
BID: 7487 
Plugin ID: 11618 
!P192.168.0.106 resolves as CLIENT!. 
Plugin ID : 12053 
!PThe following NetBIOS names have been gathered: 
EXAMPLE = Workgroup I Domain name (part of the Browser 
elections) 
CLIENTl =Computer name 
The remote host has the following MAC address on its adapter : 
OO:Oc:29:b6:4c:e6 
To prevent an attacker from gaining such information, filter TCP 
and UDP traffic 
going to ports 137,139 and 445 
CVE : CAN-1999-0621 
Plugin ID: 10150 
!PThe remote host is running Microsoft Windows XP SP2 
Plugin ID : 11936 
!tJA NTP (Network Time Protocol) server is listening on this port. 
Risk factor : Low 
Plugin ID : 10884 
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8.4 NEWT SCAN WITH PROJECT STUMPER DISABLED AND USER1 
LOGGED OUT 
Tenable Ne WT Security Reports 








5 Open Ports, 14 Notes, 5 Infos, 1 Holes. 
192.168.0.106 
:!iJPort is open 
Plugin ID : 11219 
[Return to top] 
i:::,A 'rfpoison' packet has been sent to the remote host. 
This packet is supposed to crash the 'services.exe' process, 
rendering the system instable. 
If you see that this attack was successful, have a look 
at this page : 
http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/0231/4/57 .ASP 
CVE : CVE-1999-0980 
BID: 754 
Plugin ID : 10204 
i'Port is open 
Plugin ID: 11219 
,!iJAn SMB server is running on this port 




S,.Port is open 
Plugin ID: 11219 
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!jJA CIFS server is running on this port 
Plugin ID : 11011 
!jJThe remote native Ian manager is : Windows 2000 LAN 
Manager 
The remote Operating System is : Windows 5 .1 
The remote SMB Domain Name is : EXAMPLE 
Plugin ID : 10785 
S,.It was possible to log into the remote host using a NULL 
session. 
The concept of a NULL session is to provide a null usemame 
and 
a null password, which grants the user the 'guest' access 
To prevent null sessions, see MS KB Article Q143474 (NT 4.0) 
and 
Q246261 (Windows 2000). 
Note that this won't completely disable null sessions, but will 
prevent them from connecting to IPC$ 
Please see http ://ms gs. securepoint.com/ cgi-bin/ get/nessus-
0204/ 50/ 1.html 
All the smb tests will be done as "/" in domain EXAMPLE 
CVE: CAN-1999-0504, CAN-1999-0506, CVE-2000-0222, 
CAN-1999-0505, CAN-2002-1117 
BID : 494, 990, 11199 
Plugin ID : 10394 
J;; The Terminal Services are enabled on the remote host. 
Terminal Services allow a Windows user to remotely obtain 





If an attacker gains a valid login and password, he may 
be able to use this service to gain further access 
on the remote host. An attacker may also use this service 
to mount a dictionnary attack against the remote host to try 
to log in remotely. 
Note that RDP (the Remote Desktop Protocol) is vulnerable 
to Man-in-the-middle attacks, making it easy for attackers to 
steal the credentials of legitimates users by impersonating the 
Windows server. · 
Solution : Disable the Terminal Services if you do not use 
them, and 
do not allow this service to run across the internet 
Risk factor : Medium 
CVE: CVE-2001-0540 
BID : 3099, 7258 
Plugin ID : l 0940 
~Port is open 
Plugin ID: 11219 
~For your information, here is the traceroute to 192.168.0.106 : 
192.168.0.37 
192.168.0.106 
Plugin ID : 10287 
)(The remote host is vulnerable to an 'Etherleak' -
the remote ethemet driver seems to leak bits of the 
content of the memory of the remote operating system. 
Note that an attacker may take advantage of this flaw 
only when its target is on the same physical subnet. 
See also: 




Solution : Contact your vendor for a fix 
Risk factor: High 
CVE: CAN-2003-0001 
BID: 6535 
Plugin ID: 11197 
.~The remote host answers to an ICMP timestamp request. This 
allows an attacker 
to know the date which is set on your machine. 
This may help him to defeat all your time based authentication 
protocols. 
Solution : filter out the ICMP timestamp requests (13), and 
the outgoing ICMP 
timestamp replies (14). 
Risk factor : Low 
CVE: CAN-1999-0524 
Plugin ID : 10114 
SIHere is the route recorded between 192.168.0.37 and 
192.168.0.106: 
192.168.0.106. 
Plugin ID: 12264 
~The remote host does not discard TCP SYN packets which 
have the FIN flag set. 
Depending on the kind of firewall you are using, an 






Solution : Contact your vendor for a patch 
Risk factor : Medium 
BID: 7487 
Plugin ID: 11618 
~The remote host uses non-random IP IDs, that is, it is 
possible to predict the next value of the ip_id field of 
the ip packets sent by this host. 
An attacker may use this feature to determine traffic patterns 
within your network. A few examples (not at all exhaustive) are: 
1. A remote attacker can determine if the remote host sent a 
packet 
in reply to another request. Specifically, an attacker can use your 
server as an unwilling participant in a blind portscan of another 
network. 
2. A remote attacker can roughly determine server requests at 
certain 
times of the day. For instance, if the server is sending much 
more 
traffic after business hours, the server may be a reverse proxy or 
other remote access device. An attacker can use this information 
to 
concentrate his/her efforts on the more critical machines. 
3. A remote attacker can roughly estimate the number of 
requests that 
a web server processes over a period of time. 
Solution : Contact your vendor for a patch 
Risk factor : Low 
Plugin ID : 10201 
!jli192.168.0.106 resolves as CLIENT!. 
Plugin ID : 12053 
!jliThe following NetBIOS names have been gathered : 
ntp (123/udp) 
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EXAMPLE = Workgroup I Domain name (part of the Browser 
elections) 
CLIENT 1 = Computer name 
The remote host has the following MAC address on its adapter : 
OO:Oc:29:b6:4c:e6 
To prevent an attacker from gaining such information, filter TCP 
and UDP traffic 
going to ports 137,139 and 445 
CVE : CAN-1999-0621 
Plugin ID: 10150 
itThe remote host is running Microsoft Windows XP SP2 
Plugin ID : 11936 
itA NTP (Network Time Protocol) server is listening on this port. 
Risk factor : Low 
Plugin ID : 10884 
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APPENDIX C: ETHEREAL PACKET CAPTURES 









SMB Read AndX 
Frame 1955 (1501 bytes on wire, 1501 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: OO:Oc:29:49:4d:lb, Ost: OO:Oc:29:b6:4c:e6 
Internet Protocol, Src Addr: 192.16B.O.l (192.16B.0.l), Ost Addr: 192.16B.0.106 
(192.16B.0.106) 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: microsoft-ds (445), Ost Port: 14B4 (14B4), 
Seq: 276644, Ack: 93467, Len: 1447 
NetBIOS Session Service 







































00 Oc 29 b6 4c e6 00 Oc 29 49 4d lb OB 00 45 00 
05 cf 45 3c 40 00 BO 06 2e 31 co aB 00 01 cO aB 
00 6a 01 bd 05 cc 19 96 b5 Bd ad 2B Bf 01 50 lB 
42 ef f5 9b 00 00 00 00 05 a3 ff 53 4d 42 2e 00 
00 00 00 9B 07 eB 00 00 Bf le a6 22 6e 69 a2 ad 
00 00 03 3B ff fe 00 40 BO cc Oc ff 00 00 00 ff 
ff 00 00 00 00 67 05 3c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
00 00 00 6B 05 01 4f 50 54 49 4f 4e 20 45 5B 50 
4c 49 43 49 54 Od Oa Od Oa 44 69 6d 20 54 43 50 
2c 55 44 50 Od Oa 54 43 50 20 3d 20 36 Od Oa 55 
44 50 20 3d 20 31 37 Od Oa Od Oa 44 69 6d 20 4e 
41 4d 45 2c 41 44 44 52 45 53 53 Od Oa 4e 41 4d 
45 20 3d 20 30 Od Oa 41 44 44 52 45 53 53 20 3d 
20 31 Od Oa Od Oa 4d 61 69 6e 2B 29 Od Oa Od Oa 
53 75 62 20 4d 61 69 6e 2B 29 Od Oa 09 44 69 6d 
20 4e 65 74 53 6B 61 72 69 6e 67 4d 61 6e 61 67 
65 72 Od Oa 09 Od Oa 09 53 65 74 20 4e 65 74 53 
6B 61 72 69 6e 67 4d 61 6e 61 67 65 72 20 3d 20 
57 73 63 72 69 70 74 2e 43 72 65 61 74 65 4f 62 
6a 65 63 74 2B 22 4B 4e 65 74 43 66 67 2e 4B 4e 
65 74 53 6B 61 72 65 2e 31 22 29 Od Oa 09 Od Oa 
09 49 66 2B 67 65 74 41 6c 6c 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 
74 69 6f 6e 73 2B 4e 65 74 53 6B 61 72 69 6e 67 
4d 61 6e 61 67 65 72 2c 20 22 4c 6f 63 61 6c 20 
41 72 65 61 20 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 22 
29 20 3d 20 46 61 6c 73 65 29 20 54 6B 65 6e Od 
Oa 09 09 57 53 63 72 69 70 74 2e 65 63 6B 6f 2B 
22 55 6e 61 62 6c 65 20 74 6f 20 72 65 74 72 69 
65 76 65 20 61 6c 6c 20 63 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 
6f 6e 73 2e 22 29 Od Oa 09 45 6e 64 20 49 66 Od 
Oa 45 6e 64 20 53 75 62 Od Oa Od Oa 46 75 6e 63 
74 69 6f 6e 20 67 65 74 41 6c 6c 43 6f 6e 6e 65 
63 74 69 6f 6e 73 2B 6d 61 6e 61 67 65 72 2c 20 
61 72 67 29 Od Oa 09 44 69 6d 20 72 65 74 75 72 
6e 41 72 67 75 6d 65 6e 74 Od Oa 09 72 65 74 75 
72 6e 41 72 67 75 6d 65 6e 74 20 3d 20 66 61 6c 
73 65 Od Oa 09 44 69 6d 20 61 6c 6c 43 6f 6e 6e 
65 63 74 69 6f 6e 73 Od Oa 09 44 69 6d 20 63 6f 
.. ) .L ... ) IM ... E. 
•• E<@ •••• 1 •••••• 
. j ......... ( .. P. 
B .......... SMB .. 
........... "ni .. 
••• B ••• @ •••••••• 
..... g.< ....... . 
... h .. OPTION EXP 
LICIT .... Dim TCP 
,UDP .. TCP = 6 .. U 
DP= 17 .... Dim N 
AME,ADDRESS .. NAM 
E = O .. ADDRESS = 
1 .... Main() ... . 
Sub Main() ... Dim 
NetSharingManag 









) = False) Then. 
... WScript. echo ( 
"Unable to retri 
eve all connecti 
ons. ") ... End If. 
.End Sub .... Func 
tion getAllConne 
ctions(manager, 
arg) ... Dim retur 
nArgument ... retu 
rnArgument = f al 
se ... Dim allConn 


























































6e 6e 6S 63 74 69 6f 6e Od Oa 09 44 69 6d 20 63 
6f 6e 6e 6S 63 74 69 6f 6e 50 72 6f 70 65 72 74 
69 65 73 Od Oa 09 44 69 6d 20 69 74 65 6d Od Oa 
09 44 69 6d 20 6f 62 6a 65 63 74 Od Oa 09 Od Oa 
09 S3 65 74 20 61 6c 6c 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 
6f 6e 73 20 3d 20 6d 61 6e 61 67 65 72 2e 4S 6e 
75 6d 45 76 65 72 79 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 
6e Od Oa 09 09 Od Oa 09 49 66 28 61 6c 6c 43 6f 
6e 6e 6S 63 74 69 6f 6e 73 2e 43 6f 75 6e 74 20 
3e 20 30 29 20 S4 68 65 6e Od Oa 09 09 46 6f 72 
20 4S 61 63 68 20 69 74 65 6d 20 49 6e 20 61 6c 
6c 43 6f 6e 6e 6S 63 74 69 6f 6e 73 Od Oa 09 09 
09 S3 65 74 20 63 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 20 
3d 20 6d 61 6e 61 67 65 72 2e 49 4e 65 74 53 68 
61 72 69 6e 67 43 6f 6e 66 69 67 7S 72 61 74 69 
6f 6e 46 6f 72 49 4e 65 74 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 
69 6f 6e 28 69 74 6S 6d 29 Od Oa 09 09 09 S3 65 
74 20 63 6f 6e 6e 6S 63 74 69 6f 6e SO 72 6f 70 
65 72 74 69 65 73 20 3d 20 6d 61 6e 61 67 65 72 
2e 4e 6S 74 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 50 72 
6f 70 73 28 69 74 65 6d 29 Od Oa 09 09 09 49 66 
28 53 74 72 43 6f 6d 70 28 55 63 61 73 65 28 61 
72 67 29 2c 55 63 61 73 65 28 63 6f 6e 6e 65 63 
74 69 6f 6e 50 72 6f 70 65 72 74 69 65 73 2e 4e 
61 6d 65 29 29 20 3d 20 30 29 20 54 68 65 6e Od 
Oa 09 09 09 09 S3 65 74 20 6f 62 6a 65 63 74 20 
3d 20 63 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 2e 41 64 64 
50 6f 72 74 4d 61 70 70 69 6e 67 20 28 20 2b 20 
Sf Od Oa 09 09 09 09 09 22 4b 65 72 62 65 72 6f 
73 22 2c 20 2b 20 5f Od Oa 09 09 09 09 09 54 43 
50 2c 20 2b 20 5f Od Oa 09 09 09 09 09 39 31 33 
2c 20 2b 20 5f Od Oa 09 09 09 09 09 39 31 33 2c 
20 2b 20 5f Od Oa 09 09 09 09 09 30 2c 20 2b 20 
Sf Od Oa 09 09 09 09 09 22 31 32 37 2e 30 2e 30 
2e 31 22 2c 20 2b 20 5f Od Oa 09 09 09 09 09 41 
44 44 S2 45 53 53 29 Od Oa 09 09 09 09 6f 62 6a 
65 63 74 2e 45 6e 61 62 6c 65 Od Oa 09 09 09 09 
53 6S 74 20 6f 62 6a 65 63 74 20 3d 20 63 6f 6e 
6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 2e 41 64 64 SO 6f 72 74 4d 
61 70 70 69 6e 67 20 28 20 2b 20 5f Od Oa 09 09 
09 09 09 22 S2 65 6d 6f 74 6S 20 44 6S 73 6b 74 
6f 70 22 2c 20 2b 20 5f Od Oa 09 09 09 09 09 54 
43 50 2c 20 2b 20 5f Od Oa 09 09 09 09 09 33 33 
38 39 2c 20 2b 20 5f Od Oa 09 09 09 09 09 33 33 
38 39 2c 20 2b 20 5f Od Oa 09 09 09 09 09 30 2c 
20 2b 20 5f Od Oa 09 09 09 09 09 22 31 32 37 2e 
30 2e 30 2e 31 22 2c 20 2b 20 5f Od Oa 09 09 09 
09 09 41 44 44 52 4S S3 S3 29 Od Oa 09 09 09 09 
6f 62 6a 65 63 74 2e 4S 6e 61 62 6c 65 Od Oa 09 
09 09 09 Od Oa 09 09 09 09 72 65 74 75 72 6e 41 
72 67 75 6d 65 6e 74 20 3d 20 54 72 75 65 Od Oa 
09 09 09 45 6e 64 20 49 66 Od Oa 09 09 4e 65 78 
74 Od Oa 09 45 6e 64 20 49 66 Od Oa 09 67 65 74 
41 6c 6c 43 6f 6e 6e 6S 63 74 69 6f 6e 73 20 3d 
20 72 65 74 75 72 6e 41 72 67 75 6d 65 6e 74 Od 
Oa 45 6e 64 20 46 75 6e 63 74 69 6f 6e 
nnection ... Dim c 
onnectionPropert 
ies ... Dim item .. 
.Dim object ..... 
.Set allConnecti 
ons = manager.En 
umEveryConnectio 
n ....... If(allCo 
nnections.Count 
> 0) Then .... For 






ion(item) ..... Se 
t connectionProp 
erties = manager 
.NetConnectionPr 




ame)) = 0) Then. 
..... Set object 
= connection.Add 
PortMapping ( + 
....... "Kerbero 
s", + ....... TC 
P, + ....... 913 
, + ....... 913, 
+ ....... O, + 
....... "127.0.0 
. l" I + ....... A 
DDRESS) ...... obj 
ect.Enable ..... . 
Set object = con 
nection.AddPortM 
apping ( + 
... "Remote Deskt 
op", + ....... T 
CP, + ....... 33 
89, + ....... 33 
89, + ....... 0, 
+ ....... "127. 
0. 0. l", + 
.. ADDRESS) ..... . 
object.Enable .. . 
......... returnA 
rgument = True .. 
... End If .... Nex 





C.2 USER1 FIREWALL CONFIGURATION LOGOFF SCRIPT PACKET 
No. Time 
355 1. 437971 
Source 
192.168.0.1 




SMB Read AndX 
Frame 355 (1276 bytes on wire, 1276 bytes captured) 
Ethernet II, Src: OO:Oc:29:49:4d:lb, Ost: OO:Oc:29:b6:4c:e6 
Internet Protocol, Src Addr: 192.168.0.1 (192.168.0.1), Ost Addr: 192.168.0.106 
(192 .168. 0 .106) 
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: microsoft-ds (445), Ost Port: 1505 (1505), 
Seq: 177825, Ack: 19079, Len: 1222 
NetBIOS Session Service 













































00 Oc 29 b6 4c e6 00 Oc 29 49 4d lb 08 00 45 00 
04 ee 4b 36 40 00 80 06 29 18 cO a8 00 01 cO a8 
00 6a 01 bd 05 el 2d fc lb 79 a5 ff 87 19 50 18 
43 47 50 fc 00 00 00 00 04 c2 ff 53 4d 42 2e 00 
00 00 00 98 07 e8 00 00 64 9f 27 71 8d cO 3b 62 
00 00 03 20 ff fe 00 38 81 14 Oc ff 00 00 00 ff 
ff 00 00 00 00 86 04 3c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
00 00 00 87 04 01 4f 50 54 49 4f 4e 20 45 58 50 
4c 49 43 49 54 Od Oa Od Oa 44 49 4d 20 54 43 50 
2c 55 44 50 Od Oa 54 43 50 20 3d 20 36 Od Oa 55 
44 50 20 3d 20 31 37 Od Oa Od Oa 44 49 4d 20 4e 
41 4d 45 2c 41 44 44 52 45 53 53 Od Oa 4e 41 4d 
45 20 3d 20 30 Od Oa 41 44 44 52 45 53 53 20 3d 
20 31 Od Oa Od Oa 4d 61 69 6e 28 29 Od Oa Od Oa 
53 75 62 20 4d 61 69 6e 28 29 Od Oa 09 44 69 6d 
20 4e 65 74 53 68 61 72 69 6e 67 4d 61 6e 61 67 
65 72 Od Oa 09 44 69 6d 20 61 72 67 75 6d 65 6e 
74 73 Od Oa 09 Od Oa 09 53 65 74 20 4e 65 74 53 
68 61 72 69 6e 67 4d 61 6e 61 67 65 72 20 3d 20 
57 73 63 72 69 70 74 2e 43 72 65 61 74 65 4f 62 
6a 65 63 74 28 22 48 4e 65 74 43 66 67 2e 48 4e 
65 74 53 68 61 72 65 2e 31 22 29 Od Oa 09 Od Oa 
09 49 66 28 67 65 74 41 6c 6c 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 
74 69 6f 6e 73 28 4e 65 74 53 68 61 72 69 6e 67 
4d 61 6e 61 67 65 72 2c 20 22 4c 6f 63 61 6c 20 
41 72 65 61 20 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 22 
29 20 3d 20 46 61 6c 73 65 29 20 54 68 65 6e Od 
Oa 09 09 57 53 63 72 69 70 74 2e 65 63 68 6f 28 
22 55 6e 61 62 6c 65 20 74 6f 20 72 65 74 72 69 
65 76 65 20 61 6c 6c 20 63 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 
6f 6e 73 2e 22 29 09 Od Oa 09 45 6e 64 20 49 66 
Od Oa 45 6e 64 20 53 75 62 Od Oa Od Oa 46 75 6e 
63 74 69 6f 6e 20 67 65 74 41 6c 6c 43 6f 6e 6e 
65 63 74 69 6f 6e 73 28 6d 61 6e 61 67 65 72 2c 
20 61 72 67 29 Od Oa 09 44 69 6d 20 72 65 74 75 
72 6e 41 72 67 75 6d 65 6e 74 Od Oa 09 72 65 74 
75 72 6e 41 72 67 75 6d 65 6e 74 20 3d 20 66 61 
6c 73 65 Od Oa 09 44 69 6d 20 61 6c 6c 43 6f 6e 
6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 73 Od Oa 09 44 69 6d 20 63 
6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e Od Oa 09 44 69 6d 20 
63 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 50 72 6f 70 65 72 
74 69 65 73 Od Oa 09 44 69 6d 20 69 74 65 6d 2c 
20 69 74 65 6d 32 Od Oa 09 44 69 6d 20 70 6f 72 
74 73 Od Oa 09 Od Oa 09 53 65 74 20 61 6c 6c 43 
.. ) .L ... ) IM ... E. 
•• K6@ ••• ) ••••••• 
. j .... - .. y .... p. 
CGP ........ SMB .. 
• • • • • • .. d. I q .. ;b 
...... 8 ....... . 
....... < ....... . 
...... OPTION EXP 
LICIT .... DIM TCP 
,UDP .. TCP = 6 .. U 
DP= 17 .... DIM N 
AME, ADDRESS .. NAM 
E = O .. ADDRESS = 
1 .... Main() ... . 
Sub Main() ... Dim 
NetSharingManag 
er ... Dim argumen 









) = False) Then. 
... WScript. echo ( 
"Unable to retri 
eve all connecti 
ons.") .... End If 
.. End Sub .... Fun 
ction getAllConn 
ections(manager, 
arg) ... Dim retu 
rnArgument ... ret 
urnArgument = fa 
lse ... Dim allCon 
nections ... Dim c 
onnection ... Dim 
connectionProper 
ties ... Dim item, 
item2 ... Dim por 






































6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 73 20 3d 20 6d 61 6e 
61 67 65 72 2e 45 6e 75 6d 45 76 65 72 79 43 6f 
6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e Od Oa 09 09 Od Oa 09 49 
66 28 61 6c 6c 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 73 
2e 43 6f 75 6e 74 20 3e 20 30 29 20 54 68 65 6e 
Od Oa 09 09 46 6f 72 20 45 61 63 68 20 69 74 65 
6d 20 49 6e 20 61 6c 6c 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 
6f 6e 73 Od Oa 09 09 09 53 65 74 20 63 6f 6e 6e 
65 63 74 69 6f 6e 20 3d 20 6d 61 6e 61 67 65 72 
2e 49 4e 65 74 53 68 61 72 69 6e 67 43 6f 6e 66 
69 67 75 72 61 74 69 6f 6e 46 6f 72 49 4e 65 74 
43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 28 69 74 65 6d 29 
Od Oa 09 09 09 53 65 74 20 63 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 
69 6f 6e 50 72 6f 70 65 72 74 69 65 73 20 3d 20 
6d 61 6e 61 67 65 72 2e 4e 65 74 43 6f 6e 6e 65 
63 74 69 6f 6e 50 72 6f 70 73 28 69 74 65 6d 29 
Od Oa 09 09 09 49 66 28 55 63 61 73 65 28 61 72 
67 29 20 3d 20 55 63 61 73 65 28 63 6f 6e 6e 65 
63 74 69 6f 6e 50 72 6f 70 65 72 74 69 65 73 2e 
4e 61 6d 65 29 29 20 54 68 65 6e Od Oa 09 09 09 
09 53 65 74 20 70 6f 72 74 73 20 3d 20 63 6f 6e 
6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 2e 45 6e 75 6d 50 6f 72 74 
4d 61 70 70 69 6e 67 73 28 30 29 Od Oa Od Oa 09 
09 09 09 46 6f 72 20 45 61 63 68 20 69 74 65 6d 
32 20 49 6e 20 70 6f 72 74 73 Od Oa 09 09 09 09 
09 63 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 2e 52 65 6d 6f 
76 65 50 6f 72 74 4d 61 70 70 69 6e 67 28 69 74 
65 6d 32 29 Od Oa 09 09 09 09 4e 65 78 74 Od Oa 
09 09 09 09 Od Oa 09 09 09 09 72 65 74 75 72 6e 
41 72 67 75 6d 65 6e 74 20 3d 20 54 72 75 65 Od 
Oa 09 09 09 09 45 78 69 74 20 46 6f 72 Od Oa 09 
09 09 45 6e 64 20 49 66 Od Oa 09 09 4e 65 78 74 
Od Oa 09 45 6e 64 20 49 66 Od Oa 09 67 65 74 41 
6c 6c 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 73 20 3d 20 
72 65 74 75 72 6e 41 72 67 75 6d 65 6e 74 Od Oa 
45 6e 64 20 46 75 6e 63 74 69 6f 6e 
onnections = man 
ager.EnumEveryCo 
nnection ....... I 
f(allConnections 
.Count > 0) Then 
.... For Each ite 
m In allConnecti 
ons ..... Set conn 









g) = Ucase(conne 
ctionProperties. 
Name)) Then ..... 
.Set ports = con 
nection.EnumPort 
Mappings(O) ..... 
... For Each item 
2 In ports ..... . 
.connection.Remo 
vePortMapping(it 
em2) ...... Next.. 
.......... return 
Argument = True. 
..... Exit For ... 
.. End If .... Next 
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